People vs Nardo

The case:
This case is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Albay, Branch III, which imposed on accused-appellant the death penalty for rape in Criminal Case No. 7170.

Facts:
The victim, Lorielyn Nardo, is the eldest daughter of accused- appellant. She was born on September 11, 1981 and, at the time of the incident, was fourteen (14) years old. During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray the victim as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited wherein the victim supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents' permission to leave the house. The defense also presented Atty. Gonzales (employer of the accused) as a witness which describes the victim as the one capable of concocting lies.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime of rape was established.

Ruling:
While lying may constitute a habit, the court believes that the falsehoods committed by the victim assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one's own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions. Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: "Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like."

On the argument of the accused-appellant that the trial court should have given credence to the witness, Atty. Santer G. Gonzales, because he is a member of the bar, the court reasoned out that the witness took the witness stand not as a lawyer but as an ordinary person. He testified in his capacity as accused-appellant's employer. As such, no special privilege should be accorded him by the trial court by reason of his being a member of the bar. He did not appear in that case as an officer of the court but as a mere witness, and hence should be treated as one.

Sifting through the entire body of evidence presented in this case, the court find nothing which would destroy the moral certainty of accused- appellant's guilt. While there may be some inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim, these are considered as minor inconsistencies which serve to strengthen her credibility as they are badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood. Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities. Besides, a rape victim cannot be expected to recall vividly all the sordid details of the violation committed against her virtue.

People vs Edualino

Facts:

This is a review of the conviction of a rape case filed against Jesus Edualino by the complainant Rowena Nantiza a married and pregnant woman at the time of the incident.

The complainant version of fact states that she was invited to drink one bottle of beer by then a drunk Edualino. When she was semi-conscious she was dragged in a place where the evil acts were consummated.

The accused arguments rely on alternative defenses and alibi, to wit; 1) that there was foreplay and orgasm that occurred in the alleged consummation and that according to the defense bear the earmarks of a voluntary and mutual coition of a consensual intercourse 2) that the character of the complainant is of ill-refute on the basis that no responsible and decent pregnant married woman, would be out at two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to accompany her to drink beer 3) that the complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on May 1994 while she was under the influence of drug and alcohol.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime of rape was established.


Ruling:

The crime of rape was established beyond reasonable doubt.

The court held that the victim Rowena Nantiza's testimony was sufficient to manifest that the carnal knowledge was without her consent and with due force and intimidation. The court further provides that a person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of things.

On the issue of morality of the complainant, the court pointed out that the moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The allegation of drunkenness and being a drug user will not per se preclude a finding that a woman was raped.

The Court ruled that even prostitutes can be the victims of rape.

On the Accused-appellant argument that the charge of rape was concocted by the victim to save

her marriage; the Court did not believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. The court cannot understand how a false rape story can save a marriage under the circumstances.

People vs Putian

Facts:
This is a case for murder against Putian. The two witnesses presented were the doctor who treated the victim and the policeman who arrested the suspect.The victim (Panimdim) revealed an ante mortem statement that identifies Putian as the assailant.

Issue:
Whether the statement of Panimdim is a dying declaration or a part of res gestae.

Ruling:
The court held that the declaration is not of a dying declaration because it was not made under expectation of an impending death. However, although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such declaration was made at the time of, or immediately after, the commission of the crime, or at a time when the exciting influence of the startling occurrence still continued in the declarant's mind, it is admissible as a part of the res gestae"

Western Atlantic vs Hughes

Facts:

Ira L. Hughes, a traveling fireman, was killed on the Western & Atlantic Railroad while engaged in the performance of his duties. His widow, as administratrix brought this action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in a state court of Georgia. The railroad asserts that the scintilla of evidence rule prevails in Georgia, and argues that the lower courts erred by applying the local rule in this case.

Issue:
The applicability of the rule prevailing in Georgia and the Federal rule.

Held:
It is true that the submission to the jury of contested issues of fact is not required in the federal courts, if there is only a scintilla of evidence that it is the duty of the judge to direct the verdict, when the testimony and all inference which the jury could justifiably draw therefrom would be insufficient to support a verdict for the other party, and that this federal rule must be applied by state courts in cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.

The court need not to consider whether the rule prevailing in Georgia differs substantially from the federal rule. For even under the federal rule it was proper to submit the case to the jury. The evidence introduced by the plaintiff was substantial; and was sufficient if believed, to sustain a verdict in her favor.

People vs Alegado

Facts:
The accused-appellant stands charged and convicted of two counts of rape by the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City. The accused was allegedly raped CRISTINA DEANG y VILLAROSA, a girl below twelve (12) years of age, against her will and without her consent. The accused-appellant contends that the offended party's actual age at the time of the alleged incidents of rape was not establisher with certainty; hence, it was error on the part of the trial court to convict the accused-appellant of statutory rape.

Issue:
Whether the offended party was actually below 12 years old at the time of the incidents

Held:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Under Section 40 of the said Rule, it is provided, in part, that:

SEC. 40. — Family reputation or tradition regading pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.

The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives.

In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove the victim's age is beyond question. The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person. All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.

Fuentes vs CA

Facts:
Professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of mistaken identity, petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder of Julieto Malspina. Petitioner assert the admission of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo testified that on 24 June 1989 while he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed Malaspina in "retaliation;" that he even showed him the knife he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives of the deceased. The following day however he learned that the self-confessed killer was gone and that petitioner had been arrested for a crime he did not commit.

Issue:
Whether or not the admission of Zoilo Fuentes be admitted as evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.

Held:
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.

In the instant case, the court find that the declaration against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. The reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. It is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify.

People vs Toledo

Facts:

This is a case of homicide against Toledo. Morales and Holgado agreed to a bolo duel over a parcel of land.Toledo allegedly intervened in the duel that dealt a mortal blow to Morales. Holgado executed a written testimony that during the duel there is no one present but him and the victim.

Issue:
Whether or not the statement executed by Holgado (a statement of fact against penal interest) be admitted as evidence.

Held:
Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative authority, would say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the perpetrator of a crime and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused man should not be permitted to go to prison or to the electric chair to expiate a crime he never committed.

The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard. Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable, — something else is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.