People vs Nardo

The case:
This case is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Albay, Branch III, which imposed on accused-appellant the death penalty for rape in Criminal Case No. 7170.

Facts:
The victim, Lorielyn Nardo, is the eldest daughter of accused- appellant. She was born on September 11, 1981 and, at the time of the incident, was fourteen (14) years old. During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray the victim as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited wherein the victim supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents' permission to leave the house. The defense also presented Atty. Gonzales (employer of the accused) as a witness which describes the victim as the one capable of concocting lies.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime of rape was established.

Ruling:
While lying may constitute a habit, the court believes that the falsehoods committed by the victim assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one's own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions. Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: "Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like."

On the argument of the accused-appellant that the trial court should have given credence to the witness, Atty. Santer G. Gonzales, because he is a member of the bar, the court reasoned out that the witness took the witness stand not as a lawyer but as an ordinary person. He testified in his capacity as accused-appellant's employer. As such, no special privilege should be accorded him by the trial court by reason of his being a member of the bar. He did not appear in that case as an officer of the court but as a mere witness, and hence should be treated as one.

Sifting through the entire body of evidence presented in this case, the court find nothing which would destroy the moral certainty of accused- appellant's guilt. While there may be some inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim, these are considered as minor inconsistencies which serve to strengthen her credibility as they are badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood. Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities. Besides, a rape victim cannot be expected to recall vividly all the sordid details of the violation committed against her virtue.

People vs Edualino

Facts:

This is a review of the conviction of a rape case filed against Jesus Edualino by the complainant Rowena Nantiza a married and pregnant woman at the time of the incident.

The complainant version of fact states that she was invited to drink one bottle of beer by then a drunk Edualino. When she was semi-conscious she was dragged in a place where the evil acts were consummated.

The accused arguments rely on alternative defenses and alibi, to wit; 1) that there was foreplay and orgasm that occurred in the alleged consummation and that according to the defense bear the earmarks of a voluntary and mutual coition of a consensual intercourse 2) that the character of the complainant is of ill-refute on the basis that no responsible and decent pregnant married woman, would be out at two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to accompany her to drink beer 3) that the complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on May 1994 while she was under the influence of drug and alcohol.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime of rape was established.


Ruling:

The crime of rape was established beyond reasonable doubt.

The court held that the victim Rowena Nantiza's testimony was sufficient to manifest that the carnal knowledge was without her consent and with due force and intimidation. The court further provides that a person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of things.

On the issue of morality of the complainant, the court pointed out that the moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The allegation of drunkenness and being a drug user will not per se preclude a finding that a woman was raped.

The Court ruled that even prostitutes can be the victims of rape.

On the Accused-appellant argument that the charge of rape was concocted by the victim to save

her marriage; the Court did not believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. The court cannot understand how a false rape story can save a marriage under the circumstances.

People vs Putian

Facts:
This is a case for murder against Putian. The two witnesses presented were the doctor who treated the victim and the policeman who arrested the suspect.The victim (Panimdim) revealed an ante mortem statement that identifies Putian as the assailant.

Issue:
Whether the statement of Panimdim is a dying declaration or a part of res gestae.

Ruling:
The court held that the declaration is not of a dying declaration because it was not made under expectation of an impending death. However, although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such declaration was made at the time of, or immediately after, the commission of the crime, or at a time when the exciting influence of the startling occurrence still continued in the declarant's mind, it is admissible as a part of the res gestae"

Western Atlantic vs Hughes

Facts:

Ira L. Hughes, a traveling fireman, was killed on the Western & Atlantic Railroad while engaged in the performance of his duties. His widow, as administratrix brought this action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in a state court of Georgia. The railroad asserts that the scintilla of evidence rule prevails in Georgia, and argues that the lower courts erred by applying the local rule in this case.

Issue:
The applicability of the rule prevailing in Georgia and the Federal rule.

Held:
It is true that the submission to the jury of contested issues of fact is not required in the federal courts, if there is only a scintilla of evidence that it is the duty of the judge to direct the verdict, when the testimony and all inference which the jury could justifiably draw therefrom would be insufficient to support a verdict for the other party, and that this federal rule must be applied by state courts in cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.

The court need not to consider whether the rule prevailing in Georgia differs substantially from the federal rule. For even under the federal rule it was proper to submit the case to the jury. The evidence introduced by the plaintiff was substantial; and was sufficient if believed, to sustain a verdict in her favor.

People vs Alegado

Facts:
The accused-appellant stands charged and convicted of two counts of rape by the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City. The accused was allegedly raped CRISTINA DEANG y VILLAROSA, a girl below twelve (12) years of age, against her will and without her consent. The accused-appellant contends that the offended party's actual age at the time of the alleged incidents of rape was not establisher with certainty; hence, it was error on the part of the trial court to convict the accused-appellant of statutory rape.

Issue:
Whether the offended party was actually below 12 years old at the time of the incidents

Held:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Under Section 40 of the said Rule, it is provided, in part, that:

SEC. 40. — Family reputation or tradition regading pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.

The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives.

In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove the victim's age is beyond question. The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person. All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.

Fuentes vs CA

Facts:
Professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of mistaken identity, petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder of Julieto Malspina. Petitioner assert the admission of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo testified that on 24 June 1989 while he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed Malaspina in "retaliation;" that he even showed him the knife he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives of the deceased. The following day however he learned that the self-confessed killer was gone and that petitioner had been arrested for a crime he did not commit.

Issue:
Whether or not the admission of Zoilo Fuentes be admitted as evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.

Held:
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.

In the instant case, the court find that the declaration against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. The reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. It is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify.

People vs Toledo

Facts:

This is a case of homicide against Toledo. Morales and Holgado agreed to a bolo duel over a parcel of land.Toledo allegedly intervened in the duel that dealt a mortal blow to Morales. Holgado executed a written testimony that during the duel there is no one present but him and the victim.

Issue:
Whether or not the statement executed by Holgado (a statement of fact against penal interest) be admitted as evidence.

Held:
Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative authority, would say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the perpetrator of a crime and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused man should not be permitted to go to prison or to the electric chair to expiate a crime he never committed.

The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard. Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable, — something else is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.

People vs Majuri

Facts:

This is a parricide case. Norija T. Mohamad, 30, was stabbed in the chest and diaphragm on January 28, 1972 at Calarian, Zamboanga City. She died at the Brent Hospital two days later. On March 24, 1972 Airol Aling 35, was investigated by the police. He declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration was translated into English) that he killed his wife (whom he married according to Muslim rites because he was informed in prison by his relatives that his wife was living with another man and fooling around with other men. Counsel de oficio assigned to present the side of the accused in this review, contends that the marriage of Airol to Norija was not indubitably proven.

Issue:
Whether or not the admission of Majuri established a marital relationship with the victim.

Held:
The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his penal interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"

He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law. That implies that the deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity. Her failure to visit him in prison and her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their marital status.

Maturillas vs People of the Philippines

Facts:

The case of homicide was filed against Celestino Maturillas for willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killing Artemio Pantinople. Pantinople before he died had communicated to a witness identifying the appellant as the killer. Petitioner raises the plausibility of the allegation that the victim had uttered, "Tabangi ko p’re, gipusil ko ni kapitan" ("Help me p’re, I was shot by the captain"), which was considered by the two lower courts either as his dying declaration or as part of res gestae.

Issue:
Whether or not the statement of Pantinople is a dying declaration.

Ruling
The court held that statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death, are entitled to the highest degree of credence and respect. Persons aware of an impending death have been known to be genuinely truthful in their words and extremely scrupulous in their accusations.The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who knows of one’s impending death will make a careless and false accusation.

To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarant’s death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to testify.

The statement of the deceased certainly concerned the cause and circumstances surrounding his death. He pointed to the person who had shot him. As established by the prosecution, petitioner was the only person referred to as kapitan in their place. It was also established that the declarant, at the time he had given the dying declaration, was under a consciousness of his impending death.

True, he made no express statement showing that he was conscious of his impending death. The law, however, does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death. The perception may be established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the declarant’s injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of impending death. Even if the declarant did not make an explicit statement of that realization, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of being in a dying condition.

The statement was made freely and voluntarily, without coercion or suggestion, and was offered as evidence in a criminal case for homicide. In this case, the declarant was the victim who, at the time he uttered the dying declaration, was competent as a witness.

As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it was "a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning. It [was] complete and [was] not merely fragmentary." Testified to by his wife and neighbor, his dying declaration was not only admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and telling piece of evidence.

Res Gestae
The fact that the victim’s statement constituted a dying declaration does not preclude it from being admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of both are present.

People vs. Salison

Facts:
The appellant was accused of murder of Valmoria. Valmoria relates the events that transpired between the herein appellant and himself to Alcoseba who reduced it into writing in which the victim affixed his signature. Appellant maintains that the written statement by the victim (Valmoria) is inadmissible as evidence since it was in the Cebuano regional language and was not accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino and not to be considered as a dying declaration for the victim is not under the consciousness of the impending death.

Issue:
Whether or not the statement is admissible as evidence as a dying declaration.

Held:
The court held that the statement made in oral form, are not rendered inadmissible as they may even be communicated by means of signs. If such declarations have thereafter been reduced to writing and signed by the declarant, the writing is generally held to be the best evidence, and it must be produced.
More than once, this Court has taken into consideration documents written in a Philippine dialect, unaccompanied by the required translation but which had been admitted in evidence without objection by the accused.In those instances, the Court merely ordered official translations to be made. It is true that Section 33, Rule 132 of the revised Rules of Court now prohibits the admission of such document in an unofficial language but we believe that in the interest of justice, such injunction should not be taken literally here, especially since no objection thereto was interposed by appellant, aside from the fact that appellant, the concerned parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document was written. There was, therefore, no prejudice caused to appellant and no reversible error was committed by that lapse of the trial court.

Also, the written declaration was duly presented during the trial and the person who reduced the victim's declaration into writing was thoroughly questioned by the court and the prosecutor, and cross-examined by the defense counsel. The witness was able to explain and discuss what was written in the declaration and how she came to prepare the same. Significantly, everything written in that declaration of the victim was confirmed by the Government's eyewitnesses. Appellant's argument regarding the inadmissibility of the declaration on a mere technicality would mean the loss of a vital piece of evidence that could yield the true facts and give retributive justice in the murder of Valmoria.

Appellant likewise argues that the declaration made by the victim before the purok leader can not be considered as a dying declaration because it was not made by the deceased "under the consciousness of an impending death." As earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he would recover and be able to testify against his assailants. At all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive.

People vs Laquinon

Facts:
Accused Gregorio Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder in the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur for the killing of Pablo Remonde. Laquinon was impleaded based on the statement (dying declaration) of Remonde that was revealed to Buat.The accused-appellant argues that the foregoing statement is inadmissible in evidence as an ante-mortem declaration because it was not executed under a consciousness of an impending death; and that the deceased was not a competent witness.

Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of the deceased is a dying declaration and is considered admissible evidence.

Held:
The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."

However, the said statement may be admitted as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.

Tison vs CA

Facts:

This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation from the property disputed property presenting documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent contended that the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination.

Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible.

Held:
The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

Southeastern College Inc vs CA (torts)

Facts:

After a typhoon a complaint of culpa aquiliana was filed against the School for the reason that one of their buildings was considered a structural hazard and the reason of inhabitability of the nearby houses .The complaint is rooted to the claim that the school has a defective roofing structure and that they have been remiss on the maintenance of such building. The school (petitioner) averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building, which houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is "in tip-top condition"; and furthermore, typhoon "Saling" was "an act of God and therefore beyond human control" such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part.

Issue:
Whether or not the destruction of the nearby houses was caused by a fortuitous event.

Held:
It was held that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon "Saling" was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents' house.

People vs Catubay

Facts:

Nerio Gaddi y Catubay (Appellant) was charged with murder for the death of one Augusto Esguerra y Navarro. Appellant disputes that the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as a basis for his conviction. Appellant's claim that Ernesto Guzman's testimony on Gaddi's confession of the crime to him cannot be given credence for being hearsay.

Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of the witness’ as to the confession of the appellant is hearsay evidence.

Held:
The court held that the testimony of witness Guzman falls in the exception of the hearsay rule. The Rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance."

People vs Lungayan

Facts:
A widow of 52 years complained raped against a 48 year old man. Allegedly she was sexually molested against her will.The other party contended that the act is consensual on both parties citing the overt acts of the complainant, to wit; 1)not revealing the alleged raped immediately after the incident 2) going out with the man in the evening which a 52 years of a prudent have the assumption of risk.

Issue:
Whether or not the acts of the complainant a part of res gestae.

Held:
The revelation that was made by the complainant to her daughter the day after the incident was not considered a part of a res gestae.To be considered as one the act should be spontaneous to the incident .The time to re-organize or to formulate a make-up stories should be eliminated.

17. Palmer v. Hoffman (318 U.S. 109)

A signed statement of a railroad engineer, since deceased, giving his version of a grade crossing accident in which the locomotive he was operating was involved, and made two days after the accident, when he was interviewed by an official of the company and a representative of a state commission, held not made "in the regular course" of business within the meaning of the Act of June 20, 1936, and not admissible as evidence there under.

Facts:
Mrs. Palmer was hit and killed. Mr. Palmer sued the train company for negligence. Palmer alleged that the train did not ring its bell, blow its whistle, or have its lights on as were required by law. At trial, the train company (represented by Hoffman) attempted to introduce a transcript of statement the train conductor had with the Mass Public Utilities Commission (a normal part of any train accident investigation).Palmer objected on the grounds that the out of court statement was hearsay. Hoffman argued that the statement was an exception to hearsay because it was an official business record and made in the regular course of business.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the statement made by the conductor of the train was made in the regular course of business.

Ruling:
The US Supreme Court found that the phrase” in the regular course of business” referred to timetables, accounting and other normal business activities. The train conductor’s statement was not a record made for the systematic conduct of a business as a business. While an accident report may affect the business, it is not typical of entries made systematically or as a matter of routine to record events, occurrences or transactions. Basically, the fact that a company records its employee’s version of their accidents does not put those statements in the class of records made “in the regular course of business”. The conductor’s statement was not made for business purposes, it was made to prove the truth of the conductor’s version of events and assist the company in avoiding tort liability. The primary usage of such statement is in litigating, not in railroading.