Thursday, February 4, 2010

People vs Majuri

Facts:

This is a parricide case. Norija T. Mohamad, 30, was stabbed in the chest and diaphragm on January 28, 1972 at Calarian, Zamboanga City. She died at the Brent Hospital two days later. On March 24, 1972 Airol Aling 35, was investigated by the police. He declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration was translated into English) that he killed his wife (whom he married according to Muslim rites because he was informed in prison by his relatives that his wife was living with another man and fooling around with other men. Counsel de oficio assigned to present the side of the accused in this review, contends that the marriage of Airol to Norija was not indubitably proven.

Issue:
Whether or not the admission of Majuri established a marital relationship with the victim.

Held:
The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his penal interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"

He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law. That implies that the deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity. Her failure to visit him in prison and her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their marital status.

Maturillas vs People of the Philippines

Facts:
The case of homicide was filed against Celestino Maturillas for willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killing Artemio Pantinople. Pantinople before he died had communicated to a witness identifying the appellant as the killer. Petitioner raises the plausibility of the allegation that the victim had uttered, "Tabangi ko p’re, gipusil ko ni kapitan" ("Help me p’re, I was shot by the captain"), which was considered by the two lower courts either as his dying declaration or as part of res gestae.

Issue:
Whether or not the statement of Pantinople is a dying declaration.

Ruling
The court held that statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death, are entitled to the highest degree of credence and respect. Persons aware of an impending death have been known to be genuinely truthful in their words and extremely scrupulous in their accusations.The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who knows of one’s impending death will make a careless and false accusation.

To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarant’s death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to testify.

The statement of the deceased certainly concerned the cause and circumstances surrounding his death. He pointed to the person who had shot him. As established by the prosecution, petitioner was the only person referred to as kapitan in their place. It was also established that the declarant, at the time he had given the dying declaration, was under a consciousness of his impending death.

True, he made no express statement showing that he was conscious of his impending death. The law, however, does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death. The perception may be established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the declarant’s injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of impending death. Even if the declarant did not make an explicit statement of that realization, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of being in a dying condition.
The statement was made freely and voluntarily, without coercion or suggestion, and was offered as evidence in a criminal case for homicide. In this case, the declarant was the victim who, at the time he uttered the dying declaration, was competent as a witness.
As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it was "a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning. It [was] complete and [was] not merely fragmentary." Testified to by his wife and neighbor, his dying declaration was not only admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and telling piece of evidence.
Res Gestae
The fact that the victim’s statement constituted a dying declaration does not preclude it from being admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of both are present.

Wednesday, February 3, 2010

People vs. Salison

Facts:
The appellant was accused of murder of Valmoria. Valmoria relates the events that transpired between the herein appellant and himself to Alcoseba who reduced it into writing in which the victim affixed his signature. Appellant maintains that the written statement by the victim (Valmoria) is inadmissible as evidence since it was in the Cebuano regional language and was not accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino and not to be considered as a dying declaration for the victim is not under the consciousness of the impending death.

Issue:
Whether or not the statement is admissible as evidence as a dying declaration.

Held:
The court held that the statement made in oral form, are not rendered inadmissible as they may even be communicated by means of signs. If such declarations have thereafter been reduced to writing and signed by the declarant, the writing is generally held to be the best evidence, and it must be produced.
More than once, this Court has taken into consideration documents written in a Philippine dialect, unaccompanied by the required translation but which had been admitted in evidence without objection by the accused.In those instances, the Court merely ordered official translations to be made. It is true that Section 33, Rule 132 of the revised Rules of Court now prohibits the admission of such document in an unofficial language but we believe that in the interest of justice, such injunction should not be taken literally here, especially since no objection thereto was interposed by appellant, aside from the fact that appellant, the concerned parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document was written. There was, therefore, no prejudice caused to appellant and no reversible error was committed by that lapse of the trial court.

Also, the written declaration was duly presented during the trial and the person who reduced the victim's declaration into writing was thoroughly questioned by the court and the prosecutor, and cross-examined by the defense counsel. The witness was able to explain and discuss what was written in the declaration and how she came to prepare the same. Significantly, everything written in that declaration of the victim was confirmed by the Government's eyewitnesses. Appellant's argument regarding the inadmissibility of the declaration on a mere technicality would mean the loss of a vital piece of evidence that could yield the true facts and give retributive justice in the murder of Valmoria.

Appellant likewise argues that the declaration made by the victim before the purok leader can not be considered as a dying declaration because it was not made by the deceased "under the consciousness of an impending death." As earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he would recover and be able to testify against his assailants. At all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive.

People vs Laquinon

Facts:
Accused Gregorio Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder in the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur for the killing of Pablo Remonde. Laquinon was impleaded based on the statement (dying declaration) of Remonde that was revealed to Buat.The accused-appellant argues that the foregoing statement is inadmissible in evidence as an ante-mortem declaration because it was not executed under a consciousness of an impending death; and that the deceased was not a competent witness.

Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of the deceased is a dying declaration and is considered admissible evidence.

Held:
The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."

However, the said statement may be admitted as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.

Tison vs CA

Facts:
This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation from the property disputed property presenting documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent contended that the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination.

Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible.

Held:
The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

Southeastern College Inc vs CA (torts)

Facts:

After a typhoon a complaint of culpa aquiliana was filed against the School for the reason that one of their buildings was considered a structural hazard and the reason of inhabitability of the nearby houses .The complaint is rooted to the claim that the school has a defective roofing structure and that they have been remiss on the maintenance of such building. The school (petitioner) averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building, which houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is "in tip-top condition"; and furthermore, typhoon "Saling" was "an act of God and therefore beyond human control" such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part.

Issue:
Whether or not the destruction of the nearby houses was caused by a fortuitous event.

Held:
It was held that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon "Saling" was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents' house.

People vs Catubay

Facts:

Nerio Gaddi y Catubay (Appellant) was charged with murder for the death of one Augusto Esguerra y Navarro. Appellant disputes that the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as a basis for his conviction. Appellant's claim that Ernesto Guzman's testimony on Gaddi's confession of the crime to him cannot be given credence for being hearsay.

Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of the witness’ as to the confession of the appellant is hearsay evidence.

Held:
The court held that the testimony of witness Guzman falls in the exception of the hearsay rule. The Rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance."